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Bank Stock Risk and Return
There is currently a widespread perception that
banks in the u.s. have become riskier in the past
several years. This view has been encouraged by
a spate of bank failures, extensive media cover-
age of problems in the industry, and legislative
efforts in Washington to restructure the banking
system. Industry observers typically cite factors
such as deregulation, increased competition, and
financial innovation as potential contributors to
this apparent increase in bank risk.
In this Letter, I analyze the recent behavior of
bank stock returns. The results suggest that the
question of bank risk in the 1980s is complex.
Banks have aitered their risk exposure, increas-
ing the sensitivity of bank stock returns to some
sources of risk, while reducing the effects of
other types of risk. U.S. banks have thus changed
their sensitivity to economic conditions and
movements in interest rates.
Bank stocks as a measure of bank risk
A crucial preliminary question is how to measure
bank risk. From a policy standpoint, the relevant
risk involves the likelihood that the bank's asset
values will deteriorate, which raises the chances
the bank will fail and require some form of
government-financed intervention. Unfortunately,
it is difficult to measure the risks associated with
sp~cific bank assets directly. The behavior of
stock returns, however, provides reasonable, and
readily available, information because there is a
direct relationship between asset risk and stock
risk. Changes in the cash flows and values of
bank assets are reflected in bank earnings. Varia-
tions in bank earnings influence the returns on
bank stocks. Although factors such as the deposit
insurance system complicate the relationship, the
risk of holding bank stocks is still informative
about bank asset risk.
There are several ways to consider the riskiness
of bank stocks. For example, the total volatility of
returns is one indicator of bank equity risk. The
greater the variability of returns, the more volatile
is the value of bank equity and thus net worth.
This total volatility of returns typically is meas-
ured by the variance or standard deviation of
stock returns.
Systematic and nonsystematic bank stock risk
Total volatility, however, may conceal change in
the sources of risk. Asset pricing models from the
finance Iiterature suggest that the total risk of an
asset's return may be due partially to systematic
risk factors and partially to factors specific to the
asset. The capital asset pricing model (CAPM),
for example, argues that returns on individual as-
sets can be explained by a single factor, namely,
the return on the so-called "market portfolio;' a
perfectly diversified portfolio of all assets. The
variability of the individual asset's return that is
related to changes in the return on the market
portfoiio is called systematic, or market, risk.
This systematic risk is characterized by the asset's
"beta" value. An "average" asset whose return
fluctuates one-for-one with the market return has
a beta equal to one. Stocks with greater than
average market-related risk exhibit betas greater
than one, while betas less thanone indicate low
market-risk assets. Any remaining asset volatility
that is unrelated to the return on the market port-
fol io is dubbed "residual" or nonsystematic risk.
Some economists argue that factors other than
the return on the market portfolio are relevant in
explaining asset returns. One alternative to the
CAPM is a two-factor model in which the return
on debt securities is included along with the re-
turn on the market portfolio of stocks to explain
individual asset returns. This model identifies two
sources of systematic risk in asset returns. As in
the CAPM, market risk, as measured by the as-
set's stock beta, refers to asset volatility that is
related to changes in the return on the market
portfolio. In addition, assets exhibit systematic
risk that is associated with changes in debt re-
turns, or so-called interest rate risk. The two-
factor model thus differentiates between stock
market betas and interest rate betas to describe
the systematic risks of asset returns. Nonsystema-
tic risk in the two-factor model is any volatility
that is unrelated either to stock market returns
or to debt returns.FRBSF
Since banks hold broadly diversified portfolios of
loans and other assets, bank stock returns often
are expected to have stock betas near one. In con-
trast, many economists believe that bank stocks
should exhibit little or no sensitivity to interest
rates. This is because hedging techniques should
enable bank managers to insulate their stocks
from the effects of interest rate risk. Evidence of
significant non-zero interest rate betas thus may
reflect a failure onthe part ofbank managers to
hedge effectively against interest rate risk.
Total bank stock risk
As part of ongoing research at this Federal
Reserve Bank, I investigated the behavior of
monthly stock returns over the period 1979-1990
using a sample of 84 large U.s. bank holding
companies. (For a more detailed discussion of
this research, see the Fall 1991 issue of the FRBSF
Economic Review.) The results from this research
highlight a number of interesting aspects of the
recent behavior of bank stock risk and returns.
First, the total volatility of bank stock returns rose
during the 1980s. From 1979 to 1990, the total
variance of bank holding company stock returns
increased, both in absolute terms and relative to
a sample of nonfinancial stocks and to govern-
mentbonds. At the same time, the average re-
turns on bank stocks fell relative to these other
assets. This suggests that bank stocks became
riskier during the 1980s and that investors were
not compensated for this risk with higher returns.
A simple look at the total variance of bank stock
returns thus supports the popular notion of in-
creased risk in banking.
Results from asset pricing models
While the total variability of bank stock returns
increased over the 1979-1990 period, finance
theory suggests that what matters for stock re-
turns is systematic risk, not total risk. An investi-
gation ofsystematic risk in bank stocks, using the
asset pricing models described above, can reveal
changes in the response of bank stock returns to
systematic factors like overall economic condi-
tions or changes in interest rates.
Over the entire 12-year period, estimates from
Cl\P,~v1-and tvvo-factor model regressions reveaJed
significant stock market betas between 0.8 and
0.9. These point estimates were relatively close
to one, as expected, and implied that bank stock
returns exhibited somewhat less market risk than
the average stock.
The sample of bank holding company stocks
displayed significant positive interest rate betas,
implying that bank stocks faced substantial inter-
est rate risk during the 1980s. The sign of the
estimated coefficient implies that an increase in
market interest rates (as reflected by a decrease
in bond returns) reduces the return on bank stocks.
Thus, banks suffered during rising interest rate
environments and benefited during periods of
fall ing rates.
An analysis based on regression equations over
subintervals of the 1979-1990 period confirmed
that the sensitivity of bank stock returns to the
two systematic risk factors changed during the
1980s. For example, stock betas rose during the
interval. Estimated stock market betas increased
from approximately 0.6 early in the period, to 1.3
in the last three years of the sample.
This finding of rising stock market betas during
the 1980s suggests that bank stock returns were
increasingly exposed to the same general eco-
nomic factors that influence the stock market. It
is difficult to pinpoint specific events that explain
this increase in the market risk ofthe banking
system. However, one possibility is that, after suf-
fering losses on LDC loans and other foreign op-
erations, U.s. banks returned their focus to the
domestic market in the latter part of the 1980s.
Compared to the late 1970s and early 1980s,
loans occupied an increasing share of bank port-
folios in this period, with particular emphasis on
real estate lending. Performance of these loans
depended on the state of the economy. As a re-
sult, banks were increasingly exposed to the same
domestic economic conditions that affected the
health of u.s. corporations.
In contrast to the estimated market betas, bank
stock returns displayed decreasing interest rate
risk from 1979 to 1990. Estimated interest rate
betas fell from approximately 0.5 in the first half
of the sample to zero by the end of the 12-year
period. This finding is notable because it con-
trasts with previous studies of bank stock returns,
as we!! as with the behavior of the same stocks
earlier in the sample period. It probably should
not be surprising, however. The banking system
was buffeted during the 1970s and early 1980sby volatile interest rates. This experience led
many depository institutions to push for financial
innovations like adjustable rate CDs and mort-
gages, as well as interest rate swaps, which
would help them insulate their portfolios from
the effects of changes in interest rates. The results
presented here confirm that banks largely suc-
ceeded in reducing the interest rate risk in their
portfolios and stock returns.
Finally, the asset pricing regressions explain at
most 40 percent of the total variance of bank
holding company stock returns. This means that
at least 60 percent of bank risk is not related to
the two systematic risk factors. Bank stocks ex-
hibit a large amount of nonsystematic, or idio-
syncratic, risk. While this finding is true of most
other stocks as well, it also implies that efforts to
understand bank stock risks must consider factors
that are specific to individual institutions, such as
individual loan risk or local economic conditions.
Bank stock risk and bank size
Banks of different sizes may have different sen-
sitivities to systematic risk factors. For example,
larger banks may have greater opportunities than
smaller banks to diversify their portfolios or to
take advantage of economies of scale in hedging
against interest rate risk. Cross-section regres-
sions confirmed that there are significant differ-
ences in estimated betas across banks of different
sizes. Of course, the sample of bank holding
companies in this analysis is not fully represen-
tative of the size range of U.S. banks, since the
smallest bank had over $2 billion in assets (as
of 1987) while the largest had over $200 billion.
The conclusions thus apply to relatively large
U.S. bank holding companies.
Regressions on four different size groupings of
banks showed that in the early 1980s, the small-
est banks (assets less than $5 billion as of 1987)
had larger stock market betas than any other size
group, although all groups had stock betas less
than one. At the same time, the smallest banks
had the lowest interest rate betas ofthe banks in
the sample. By the end of the 1980s, the estimat-
ed beta coefficients for the smallest banks showed
little change from the earlier part of the period.
The larger banks, however, exhibited higher stock
market betas and lower interest rate betas. By the
end of the 1980s, the larger banks all had market
betas that were significantly above one. At the
same time, they exhibited no evidence of interest
rate risk. It is striking that, by the end of the sam-
ple period, no group of bank stocks exhibited
any significant interest rate risk.
Conclusion
The research described here suggests that bank
stock risks changed significantly during the
1980s. The returns on these stocks became
increasingly sensitive to factors that influence
overall stock market returns. At the same time,
bank stocks were increasingly insensitive to
changes in interest rates.
While these results add to our knowledge of
bank stock risks and returns, they also highlight
what we do not know about them. The portion of
total stock return variance that is left unexplained
by traditional asset pricing models increased dur-
ing the 12 years between 1979 and 1990. This
implies a rising proportion of risk that is unre-
lated to systematic risk factors, and suggests that
it may be difficult to formulate policies that will
successfully reduce risk across a broad sample of
banks. At the very least, it also suggests that more
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